December 6th, 2017 – Fort Russ News –
– Rostislav Ishchenko, translated and edited by J. Flores for FRN – support Flores’ Patreon!
The initiative went to the opposition and the question is only whether it will be able to use the situation wisely and bring the matter to its logical conclusion.
Formally, Poroshenko’s actions were correct, but insufficient and badly organized. Indeed, the rebellion, formally headed by Saakashvili, who entered the active phase on the third of December, had to be quickly extinguished. To suppress any insurgency, it is required to quickly eliminate its leaders. They can be arrested, forced to leave the country, sent, finally killed. The urgency of a particular option is dictated by circumstances.
From this point of view, the attempt to arrest Saakashvili was seemingly the right move. But it seems to be.
It’s no secret that Saakashvili, whose rating in Ukraine was fluctuating, was only a person of insurrection. The main organizers and beneficiaries at the rallies did not speak, but were by name known (Tymoshenko, Nalivaichenko, Sadovaya, Kolomoisky). Sitting in Geneva, Kolomoisky was for Poroshenko, out of reach, but he did not have the appropriate organizational capabilities. He only financed the insurgency. The main organizers were in Kiev.
The victory or failure of any rebellion depends on the promptness and decisiveness of the actions of the parties. This is the weakness of any coup d’état dressed in the Maidan uniforms. These are stretched in time and the authorities have a chance for an adequate response. If the authorities show minimal determination and isolate leaders, then the street crowd instantly loses its striking force.
Thus, Poroshenko, if he wants to retain power (and he wants to), had to neutralize the entire top of the rebels. At the same time, Saakashvili’s arrest was also necessary, but he was not the main event. Saakashvili’s isolation had to pass simultaneously with the isolation of real leaders and it was necessary to do all this quietly.
The arrest of Saakashvili (even if he succeeded) while at the same time leaving the real organizers on the ground did not strengthen, but weakened Poroshenko’s position.
Mikhail Nikolozovich could serve as the banner of the coup in prison, and even in the grave. As a dead hero, he was even a better decision for the opposition.
Saakashvili, in the event of his tragic death or finding himself in the dungeons of the regime, could also be replaced by any of his associates. A more pragmatic and more predictable person than Saakashvili would be even more profitable for the opposition at this stage.
Thus, the attempt to arrest Saakashvili pushed the insurgency into a stage of power confrontation in conditions when all the organizational and information centers of the coup, as well as all of its communication lines, remained intact. This is the grossest mistake of Poroshenko.
But Poroshenko made another mistake.
The operation to arrest Saakashvili was carried out by the very same National Guard, who had already “failed” once with Saakashvili’s breakthrough across the border.
It’s no wonder that even this time the security forces “could not” prevent a smaller crowd from releasing Saakashvili from the hands of the “Poroshenko satraps” after a short imitation of a clash.
As a result, Poroshenko gave reason for forceful actions against himself. He first attacked and became the violator of the informal ban on forceful actions, which the parties have so far observed. Now the “indignant people” have the full right to “get out of control” of politicians and arrange for Peter Alekseevich the same fate as Ceausescu.
Provided that the parties to the conflict will act correctly, Poroshenko no longer has a chance to outplay the opposition. The best solution is to flee the country, as long as there is an opportunity and if there is somewhere.
It’s another matter that the Ukrainian opposition is not much more talented than the Ukrainian authorities and can also allow an unforced error.
If the oppositionists, who began the blockade of the Verkhovna Rada and put forward a demand for Poroshenko’s impeachment, will lose their tempo by engaging in meaningless negotiations with deputies and behind-the-scenes trading, then the opportunity for Poroshenko to recoup will appear.
When assessing the situation in Kiev, it is necessary to understand that as events have passed into a power phase (albeit for the time being in a soft power phase), the winner will be the one who will act more resolutely and more actively, not bothering about the methods of achieving the goal and the possible reaction of the world community.
The opposition has every reason to expect a quick victory. Not only because Poroshenko, as already mentioned, was the first to attack and nullify the previous rules of the game, presupposing the use of an informational propaganda and bureaucratic resource (in which the president was not inferior to the rebels). But also because, having placed a stake on force, Poroshenko once again demonstrated that he lacks the power and organizational capabilities even for Saakashvili’s arrest.
Now the opposition’s hands are unleashed. It can use force. Possible, probable and even almost inevitable bloodshed will in any case be attributed to Poroshenko.
On the other hand, people and structures that have maintained their loyalty to the president, with each new defeat, will increasingly fall into demoralization and seek ways to move to the side of the rebels.
Theoretically, if Poroshenko has several hundred ready-made siloviki ready for any action, it is still possible to reverse the situation. It is necessary only to destroy the organizational centers of the mutiny, between the street crowd and Saakashvili. Break the communications between the crowd and the leaders, leaving the cannons without target designations.
Practically, Poroshenko demonstrated his unwillingness and inability to adequately assess the situation and prompt, purposeful actions. Now, only the indecision and mistakes of the opposition can save him. But we must take into account that on the other side of the barricades of one of the key figures is Tymoshenko, who meanwhile never hesitated and whose determination has never waned.
As for the prospects of Ukraine itself, it already does not matter. Whoever wins, we can only state the further “Somalization” of the remnants of this state. The open clash of the Maidan elite testifies to the further disintegration of the Ukrainian politic into all smaller groups.
Now the struggle is no longer between the Maidan and the anti-Maidan, but between different groups of the Maidan. And in these groups, the role and weight of the oligarchy and traditional system politicians is accelerating with acceleration, and the role of street gangs that provide a power resource is growing faster.
[This was my own central thesis on how power would devolve in a failed Ukrainian state – J. Flores, ed]
However, since the February 2014 coup, it was clear that the disintegration of the system could not be stopped and reversed at the expense of the internal resources.
Without external intervention, the system had to reach a logical end – full entropy.
By this logical end, it is now rapidly approaching, and the exact order by which each faction devours another, first, does not essentially change anything.